iot-security

2 posts

cloudflare

2025 Q4 DDoS threat report: A record-setting 31.4 Tbps attack caps a year of massive DDoS assaults (opens in new tab)

Cloudflare’s 2025 DDoS report describes a dramatic escalation in both attack frequency and scale. DDoS attacks more than doubled to 47.1 million, while botnets such as Aisuru-Kimwolf launched unprecedented HTTP floods, including a record 31.4 Tbps attack. Cloudflare concludes that autonomous, adaptive mitigation is increasingly essential as attacks grow more frequent, larger, and more sophisticated. ## Record Growth in DDoS Attacks - Cloudflare mitigated 47.1 million DDoS attacks in 2025, a 121% increase from 2024 and a 236% increase since 2023. - The network automatically mitigated an average of 5,376 attacks per hour: - 3,925 network-layer attacks - 1,451 HTTP attacks - In Q4 2025, attacks increased 31% from the previous quarter and 58% year over year. - Network-layer attacks accounted for 78% of Q4 activity. ## Network-Layer Attacks More Than Triple - Network-layer attacks rose from 11.4 million in 2024 to 34.4 million in 2025. - An 18-day campaign in Q1 generated approximately 13.5 million attacks against Cloudflare infrastructure and Magic Transit customers. - The campaign used multiple vectors, including: - SYN floods - Mirai-generated attacks - SSDP amplification - Cloudflare’s systems detected and mitigated the campaign automatically. ## The Aisuru-Kimwolf “Night Before Christmas” Campaign - Beginning December 19, 2025, the Aisuru-Kimwolf botnet attacked Cloudflare and its customers with HTTP floods exceeding 20 million requests per second. - The botnet is estimated to contain 1–4 million malware-infected devices, primarily Android TVs. - During the campaign, Cloudflare mitigated 902 hyper-volumetric attacks: - 384 packet-intensive attacks - 329 bit-intensive attacks - 189 request-intensive attacks - Average attack rates reached 3 billion packets per second, 4 Tbps, and 54 million requests per second. - Maximum observed rates reached 9 Bpps, 24 Tbps, and 205 million requests per second. ## Hyper-Volumetric Attacks Reach New Records - Hyper-volumetric attacks increased 40% in Q4 compared with Q3. - Attack sizes grew more than 700% compared with large attacks in late 2024. - One attack reached 31.4 Tbps and lasted only 35 seconds. - Other record-scale attacks reached 205 million requests per second. - Telecommunications, service providers, and carriers were the primary targets, followed by gaming and generative AI services. - Cloudflare infrastructure itself faced HTTP floods, DNS attacks, and UDP floods. ## Most-Targeted Industries and Locations - Telecommunications, service providers, and carriers became the most-attacked industry, replacing Information Technology & Services. - Gambling and casinos ranked third, while gaming ranked fourth. - Computer software and business services climbed significantly in the top-ten rankings. - China, Germany, Brazil, and the United States remained among the most-attacked locations. - Hong Kong rose 12 places to become the second most-attacked location. - The United Kingdom climbed 36 places to rank sixth. Cloudflare’s data shows that organizations should prepare for attacks that combine enormous volume with rapidly changing techniques. Automated, network-scale defenses capable of identifying and adapting to large botnets are becoming a necessity rather than an optional protection.

meta

No Display? No Problem: Cross-Device Passkey Authentication for XR Devices (opens in new tab)

Passkeys provide phishing-resistant authentication, but standard cross-device flows depend on QR codes displayed on the device being authenticated. This creates a problem for XR headsets, smart-home hubs, sensors, and other devices with no accessible screen. The proposed solution uses an authenticated companion app to transport the FIDO hybrid-flow request, preserving proximity, trust, and standard WebAuthn security without requiring a QR code. ## The Challenge: Screenless Devices Cannot Display QR Codes - Traditional cross-device passkey authentication uses: - A QR code displayed by the desktop or other target device. - Bluetooth or NFC to verify proximity and establish communication. - Devices without usable displays cannot show a QR code for a phone to scan. - Proximity discovery alone is insufficient because users still need a clear, secure way to approve the correct authentication request. ## Companion Apps as Secure Message Transport - The target device generates the same hybrid-flow request normally encoded in a QR code. - Instead of displaying it, the device sends the request to an authenticated companion app associated with the same user account. - In-app notifications provide a user-consent surface and direct the user into the passkey flow. - Opening the app itself can initiate the flow because the user must deliberately open it, and mobile operating systems provide an additional verification step. ## Meta Quest and Meta Horizon Implementation - The implementation is broadly available on Meta Quest devices running Meta Horizon OS. - The Quest browser creates a FIDO URL containing: - A fresh ECDH public key. - A session-specific secret. - Routing information for the hybrid handshake. - The URL is packaged as structured data in a GraphQL-based push notification. - The Meta Horizon app validates that the request belongs to the correct signed-in user before processing it. ## Notification and Deep-Link Flow - iOS or Android displays a notification that a passkey login is pending. - Tapping the notification opens the Meta Horizon app, which launches the FIDO URL through the operating system. - The OS then invokes its passkey interface. - If notifications are disabled, opening the app queries the backend for pending requests. - Requests expire after five minutes, limiting the window for misuse. - The mobile device then performs the normal hybrid transport process: - Broadcasting a BLE advertisement. - Establishing an encrypted tunnel. - Generating the passkey assertion. ## WebAuthn Challenge and Response - The inaccessible device creates the normal WebAuthn challenge and waits for a response. - The mobile authenticator initiates the secure BLE or NFC connection. - The challenge travels through the encrypted channel. - After successful user verification, the phone creates an `AuthenticatorAssertionResponse` or `AuthenticatorAttestationResponse`. - The inaccessible device forwards that response to the relying-party server just as a display-equipped device would. ## Broader Impact - The approach removes the QR-code requirement while retaining FIDO hybrid transport and proximity protections. - It could extend passwordless authentication to: - XR headsets and wearables. - Screenless IoT devices. - Smart-home hubs. - Industrial sensors and hardware. - The work builds on FIDO Alliance standards and mobile operating-system support, helping broaden interoperability across device ecosystems. The companion-app model offers a practical way to bring secure cross-device passkeys to devices that cannot display QR codes. It is especially suitable where the device already has an authenticated mobile app and can rely on standard WebAuthn, BLE/NFC proximity, and platform user verification.